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Abstract: The verdict delivered by voters in the 2015 and 2017 British General Elections and the 
European Union Referendum surprised pollsters, pundits, the media, and even the victors. Political 
choices representative of globalist outlooks saw defeat at the polls. Liberal Democratic support was 
below 10% and voting to remain in the EU underperformed predictions. Empirical analyses 
demonstrate that there is a nationalist-globalist policy divide, partially rooted in demographics and 
authoritarian predispositions, which go beyond traditional valence factors in explaining the recent 
choices of the British electorate. Moreover, this outlook influences how satisfied citizens are with the 
way democracy works in Britain. Nationalist viewpoints, when juxtaposed against globalist outlooks, 
are salient in a way they were not during the height of Thatcherism, encompass left-right economic 
concerns and may portend a new era in British political culture. 
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I. Introduction 
Recent elections and referenda across the globe produced results that may constitute a pushback 
against globalisation.  Majorities of elected officials, business leaders, and educated citizens in 
managerial and professional positions usually favour an integrated world with few trade barriers, 
liberal immigration policies, and cosmopolitan values, but enthusiasm for these tenets appears lacking 
among key voting blocs. The rise of populist parties across Europe, Donald Trump’s successful White 
House run, and the British referendum vote to leave the European Union reveal opposition to a broad 
elite consensus.  
 
An obvious realization of the anti-globalist sentiment in Britain is the June 2016 referendum vote for 
the UK to leave the European Union. While Brexit is a consequential and headline grabbing event, it 
is not a one off.  In 2015, a General Election resulted in the drubbing of the pro-EU Liberal 
Democrats, and they did not regain much ground in the “snap election” with their call for a Brexit.  
The 2015 election saw a significant rise in the popular vote share of the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP), which for now appears to have crested.  Their downfall likely is possible 
only because both Conservative and Labour MPs signalled their agreement with the populist party’s 
raisons d’être—removing Britain from the supranational EU and restrictive immigration politics.  
Elected officials appear to acquiesce not because they believe Brexit will be a net positive for the 
United Kingdom but because they fear defeat and political ruin by the nationalist tide.   
 
In this paper, a “think piece”, we address the correlates and relevance of what we call a “nationalist—
globalist” divide to contemporary British politics.  Within this dimension sits attitudes about Britain’s 
foreign policy, immigration policies, and the government’s role in guaranteeing equal opportunity.  In 
contrast to the Thatcher period, where foreign and domestic policy attitudes appear on different axes, 
these attitudes mesh in contemporary Britain.  What distinguishes our paper from contemporary work 
on the Nationalist-Globalist divide is that in contemporary Britain, this ideological division 
encompasses traditional left-right economic attitudes.  The profile of many voters on the issues 
comprising the cleavage does not accord to the choice offered to them by contemporary British parties 
and may help to explain why the party system currently is so unstable. 
 
II. Nationalism against Globalism 
The intuition behind what we label a nationalist-globalist posture is that nationalism is a “thin centred 
ideology” (Freeden 1998: 748) because the multiplicity of ideas and policy positions associated with 
the term can find a home across the political spectrum.1 For nationalism to be meaningful, it requires 
situation within an ideological camp and juxtaposition against competing ideas. Nationalism sits 
comfortably as a form of anti-globalism, and together these concepts create a general middle rung of a 
hierarchy explained by demographics and values such as authoritarianism.2   
 
Globalism as a quasi-belief system takes on many potential forms, with Steger (2013) distinguishing 
between “market” and “justice” globalism.  In the economic realm, it involves the removal of state 
actions to control the market, deregulation, and removal of barriers that prevent the flow of capital 
across borders.  Politically, globalists wish to reduce the power of the nation-state, take measures to 
prevent the unilateral use of military force and increase the role of supra national and non-
governmental organisations.  “Justice” comes about from states ceding sovereign functions to 
international institutions which solve coordination problems over public goods such as environmental 
regulations and pursue a world more equal (and many would say economically stronger) by allowing 
the free movements of people.  Culturally, globalists recognize and often celebrate different values 
																																								 																				
1	This is not the only viewpoint—for a review of the theoretical debate over globalization as an ideology, see 
Soborski (2012) 
2 The hierarchical schema mimics the model of foreign policy attitudes of Hurwitz and Peffley (1987).  
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and backgrounds.  Scholars are aware of the role of citizen differences on aspects of the globalist 
divide on political choice.  Van Der Brug and Van Spanje (2009) and Teney et al. (2014) argue that 
the globalist-nationalist cleavage is a second and emergent dimension of political conflict in Europe. 
Kriesi et al. (2008) and Azmanova (2011) see the potential for the globalist-nationalist conflict to 
supplant the left-right economic cleavage in European politics.   
A strategy for populist party success in the 1990s was economic liberalism, opposition to immigration 
and supra-national integration, and cultural conservatism (Kitschelt and McGann 1995).  This tactic 
affirms the market form of globalism while rejecting its other tenets.  As noted in a later paper 
(McGann and Kitschelt 2005: 149), critiques of this “winning formula” abound because of questions 
as to whether those with nationalist attitudes on culture, foreign policy, and immigration endorse neo-
liberal economics (e.g. Betz 1996; Mudde 1996).  At the mass level, few scholars view the mass issue 
space as uni-dimensional.  Foreign and domestic affairs receive consideration as two different realms 
and Europe and cultural issues are sources of conflict that do not co-integrate with small versus big 
state type economic debates (Kriesi et al. 2008).  When voters prioritize issues on the cultural-justice 
aspect of the globalist-nationalist cleavage so-called right wing populist parties see success partially 
because the supply of parties who favour economic integration and oppose immigration is low (Van 
Der Brug and Van Spanje 2009).   
There is reason to challenge the assumption that market and justice globalism are multi-dimensional 
in contemporary British politics.  The strain of nationalism emerging post-2008 is distinct from the 
nationalism that undergirded the rise of Margaret Thatcher. Broad support for Thatcher-era reforms 
(as well as the birth of Tony Blair’s ‘New Labour’) derived from a “reassemblement of the 
establishment” (Jessop 2016: 133-134) marked by broad elite consensus favouring a neoliberal 
economic program.  There is now a perception of decades of stagnation among average Britons, and 
blame for this lies with neoliberalism for delivering uneven prosperity. The 2008 financial crisis holds 
particular relevance as a near cataclysmic failure by elites, but with little to no accountability among 
elites. The British public experienced the pain of austerity, whereas elites continued with business as 
usual. To the extent that this account captures the “zeitgeist”, it is hardly surprising that elites who are 
“tone deaf” to the realities faced by everyday working citizens gives rise to an electorate desperate for 
change.  In Britain, the initial supply of options came from the right, with members of the 
Conservative Party openly challenging the consensus on Europe and immigration, but remaining 
committed to neo-liberalism.  UKIP downplayed the economy as an issue and challenged the divided 
Conservatives from a uniformly nationalist approach to immigration and Europe (Ford and Goodwin 
2014).  In the United Kingdom, however, we now have the question as to whether, with Jeremy 
Corbyn’s capture—and defence—of the Labour leadership via direct elections and his Party’s 
surprisingly strong showing in the 2017 General Election, we have a left-wing anti-globalist party that 
now supplies voters with an option not seen in the party families of Western Europe.  Corbyn’s 
Labour is unabashedly nationalist and, at the time of this writing, appears to be at peace with the need 
for stricter immigration policies and the decision of the British electorate to leave the European 
Union.  
 
In this speculative paper, we argue that it is possible to construct empirically a clear narrative of the 
policy correlates of this anti-globalist anger.  An elite globalist mind-set is one supportive of open 
markets, tolerant of immigration, enthusiastic about redistribution and income inequality (with foreign 
aid generating particular ire), and one happy to reduce national power thru a preference for 
international consensus in foreign policy decision-making.  Elite consensus over the general 
parameters do not match the mass disunity present in modern Britain. Indeed, positions taken by 
opinion leader’s accord with only a minority of the voters, giving rise to new players emerge, which 
advantage of unfilled gaps in the issue space.  In many respects, this is classic Schattschneider-
inspired or Downsian politics—leaders and parties arise by changing the scope of political conflict.  
In England, the rejection of the globalist worldview was evident with the collapse of the Liberal 
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Democrat vote share and rise of UKIP in the 2015 General Election.  The EU Referendum and the 
election of renegade Jeremy Corbyn in two leadership contests delivered a message to Britain’s two 
major parties—co-opt the nationalist mantra or go down to defeat.  In the 2017 General Election, 
Labour and the Tories succeeded by acquiescing to delivering Brexit and restrictions on immigration.  
The Scottish National Party and Liberal Democrats who did not make peace with these policies 
performed poorly. 
 
Our approach conceptualises the new nationalism as the binding of domestic attitudes that are hostile 
to outgroups with a “Britain first” approach to international relations. In the next sections, we more 
fully discuss operationalization of these concepts, and we test whether data supports our story. 
Britons feeling left behind by a changing global economy likely do not see the benefits of 
immigration, European integration and comparative advantage. Rather, many view themselves as 
unfairly shunted aside, and benefits flowing to groups that do not share their values. To many, the 
policies advocated by the elite consensus are not the solution to “average citizens” but indeed the 
problem.  Importantly, we hypothesize those opposed to cultural or justice globalism are not 
necessarily warm to economic globalism.   
 
 
 
III. Data and Constructing the Nationalist-Globalist Posture 
In March 2014, a representative quota sample of 5,125 respondents from YouGov’s online British 
panel completed a questionnaire designed to ascertain their attitudes about the political challenges and 
issues facing Great Britain.3 Our hypothesis is that we can classify citizens’ outlooks as a globalist, 
nationalist, or something in between via examining their positions on five items:4  
 
1) “We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.”   
2) “All further immigration to the UK should be halted.” 
3) “The UK needs a strong military to be effective in international relations.” 
4) “The UK doesn't need to withdraw from international affairs, it just needs to stop letting 
international organisations tell us what we can and can't do.” 
5) A 7-point bipolar scale with endpoints “Government should get out of the business of 
promoting income equality” and “Government should do more to reduce income inequality.” 
 
We code responses so that higher values indicate greater scepticism over immigration, non-
governmental oversight of British actions, and income and rights equality and a greater desire to see 
the UK maintain a strong military. The average respondent shows scepticism towards the more 
“globalist” positions of respecting equal rights, welcoming immigration, and seeking diplomatic, 
multilateral solutions to the world’s challenges.5  In contrast, the average respondent for the seven-
point income equality scale is at the midpoint (3.53), suggesting that Britons are nationalists on the 
cultural and justice indicators but not necessarily globalists on the economic side.  
 
 
 
																																								 																				
3 The sampling frame excludes respondents residing in Northern Ireland. Data are weighted. Our data come 
from a multi-wave dataset spanning several years. Our measures of authoritarianism come from the first wave of 
the survey, fielded more than two years prior to questions concerning the EU Referendum we use as one of our 
dependent variables.  ESRC funded data to replicate empirical analysis are available via the UK Data Archive:  
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-851142/ 
4 The first four items are five point agree-disagree Likert scales, while the fifth is a self-placement on a seven-
point bipolar scale. 
5	Space restrictions require the table with response distributions of the items to the Online Appendix. 
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IV. Validating the Nationalist-Globalist Posture: The Divided British Populace 
 
To answer the question of whether these five items sit together as a single posture, we employ two 
types of latent variable analyses. An initial Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) treats responses to 
the survey items as ordinal and suggests that a hypothesized single factor model fit the data well.6  
The five-indicator model containing the economic equality measure does not substantially worsen 
standard approximate fit statistics, suggesting the various aspects of nationalism-globalism can form a 
coherent measure in contemporary Britain.  This single factor solution combining foreign and 
domestic policy items reflective of what we consider multiple aspects of the nationalist-globalist 
divide contrasts with a factor analysis of similar indicators from the 1983 British Election Study 
conducted at the height of Thatcherism.7 
 
To validate our empirical claims further and classify voters for the multivariate models to follow, we 
employ latent profile analysis (LPA) (a “mixture” model) to ascertain how the 2014 British sample 
clusters on the five items.  LPA treats the items as continuous and looks for underlying and 
unobserved groups with similar means across items while accounting for the presence of measurement 
error (Oberski 2016).  This technique classifies voters into simple nominal classes based upon the 
attitudes tapped by these five indicators.  Optimum fit for the LPA analysis, estimated via Mplus 
(v.7.4), occurs by splitting the sample into three profiles.8 
 
Profiles with four and five indicators, with full results presented in Table 1, yield interesting but 
slightly different stories. For the four-item estimation (without the “promote equality” indicator), 
nearly half (47%) of all respondents fit a “Moderate Globalist” profile. In addition, approximately 
25% of the sample we define as “Nationalist” and an additional 29% as anti-immigrant but having 
slightly less nationalist attitudes on the other indicators.    
 
The three profiles from the five-indicator analysis present an alternative outlook. Here, we see a larger 
moderate category (approximately 60% of the sample). These profile members bend in the nationalist 
direction on all but the income inequality indicators.  The other two profiles in the five-item analysis 
constitute smaller proportions (compared to the four-item profiles), but contain distinct average 
positions. There is a small group of respondents (11%) in a profile containing stridently globalist 
positions on immigration, equal rights, but favouring income redistribution.  In a cultural and justice 
sense, they are globalist but in an economic sense, they are not. On matters of foreign policy, 
members of this profile are more sceptical of a strong military while more welcoming of international 
consensus building. The remaining profile (29% of the sample) contains respondents deeply hostile to 
immigration (mean position on the five-point scale=4.71), militarist and unilateralist in their outlook, 
																																								 																				
6 The Online Appendix contains the full results from the CFA.  The “income equality” indicator has the weakest 
association with the latent variable, but it still points to the contradiction that those most sceptical of cultural and 
justice globalism are moderate on this indicator while the small number supportive of cultural and justice 
globalism are highly sceptical of neoliberal economic policies.  The different policy domains are not orthogonal 
to one another. 
7 Results from a CFA of the 1983 BES data are in the Online Appendix.  A single factor can only explain 
domestic policy item responses, with this latent variable explaining a very low percentage of the variance of the 
foreign policy indicators. 
8 A Vuong-Lo-Mendell-Rubin Likelihood Ratio test (Vuong 1989) comparing the three-profile solution to one 
with only two profiles is significant in both instances.  A four-profile solution for the four and five indicator 
models did not converge because of “boundary solutions” between the fourth extracted profile and the 
immigration indicator (Abar and Loken 2012). Fixing the variance of the indicator to a very small number 
allows for a solution, but differentiating between profiles becomes difficult.  
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and yet are only slightly more accepting of income inequality than those residing in the moderate 
profile. We label this profile “Nationalist”.9  
 
In summary, the five-indicator LPA places most of the British electorate into a “moderate” category, 
but it is important to note that the mean score of the moderate profile respondents on most of the 
scales. Further, more than double the number of Britons fall into a “Nationalist” as opposed to 
“Globalist” profile in the five-indicator model. Taken together, these results show that a substantially 
large proportion of the British public is at least moderately nationalist, with a sizable minority being 
very nationalist.  However, even those in the profile most sceptical of cultural and justice globalism 
do not find themselves at the extreme end of favouring the laissez-faire approach often attributed to 
economic globalism. 
 
V. The Demographic and Authoritarian Correlates of the Nationalist-Globalist Divide 
Citizen outlooks along the globalist-nationalist divide have important and understandable 
demographic antecedents.10 There are meaningful differences in profile membership based on age, 
profession, and education. There are also modest differences based on region, but only negligible 
differences in profile membership based on gender.  
 
Highlights from the five-indicator model are that older respondents are disproportionately nationalist 
compared to younger respondents (37% to 17%, respectively). Working class voters are least likely to 
have a globalist orientation (8%) and most likely to fit into the nationalist profile (34%). White-collar 
professionals and managers are far more likely to be globalist (15%) and far less likely to be 
nationalist (21%) than other occupation groups. University degree holders are more globalist than 
those with less education. Scotland is home to more globalists (15%) and fewer nationalists (22%) 
than other regions of the United Kingdom.11 Interestingly, while the East of England is the region 
hosting the highest percentage of respondents in the Nationalist profile (36%), not far behind them are 
traditional Labour Party bastions of the Northeast (34%) and Yorkshire and Humber (33%) regions.  
 
In addition to the demographic antecedents, we think there are there is an important attitudinal 
disposition that is causally prior to the nationalist-globalist divide—authoritarianism.12 
																																								 																				
9	To avoid wordiness, we use the terms “Globalist” and “Nationalist” to describe the latent profiles for the 
remainder of the paper.  We remind readers that those in the former are highly sceptical of weakening national 
efforts to regulate the economy, and those in the latter group have attitudes on the matter that are far from 
libertarian.  	
10	The Online Appendix presents demographic cross-tabulations for both the four- and five- indicator LPAs. A 
simple cut-off differentiates university graduates and non-university graduates because of the vast press 
commentary on the more globalist outlook of those with university experience.  For the multi-variate analyses, 
robustness checks reveal that key findings concerning the demographic correlates of the profiles and the 
relationship between the correlates and political choices remain when controls for more refined levels of 
education appear in the models. 	
11	An anonymous reviewer wisely noted the irony of weak “nationalist” opinion in Scotland, a nation within the 
UK governed by a “nationalist” party.  This reinforces our above point about the “thin centeredness” of 
nationalism, and its need to sit against competing ideas.  Aside from making a case for independence, recent 
Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) manifestos appear to stand deliberately against ideas espoused by the 
governing Westminster Conservatives.  Embracing progressive ideas concerning immigration and the need to be 
a “post-sovereign” state adhering to norms and rules generated by international organisations build the SNP’s 
case that Scotland is different (Jackson 2014). For more on the embrace of cultural pluralism and values 
considered post-materialist by the nationalist parties such as the SNP, see van der Zwet (2015).	
12 Three items attempt to capture different facets of authoritarianism outlined by Altemeyer (1981): “Obedience 
and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn” (authoritarian submission); “Our 
customs and national heritage are the things that have made us great, and certain people should be made to show 
greater respect for them” (traditionalism); and “Parents and other authorities have forgotten that good old-
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Authoritarianism should affect this globalist-nationalist because to nationalists, the nation already has 
optimal values and traditional arrangements worth preserving; violations of societal conventions and 
order are what ‘broke things’. Authoritarianism drives anger and resentment towards the beneficiaries 
of a more interconnected and cosmopolitan world—whether rich and educated urban elite or low-
skilled immigrants or minorities—because they are perceived to undermine the core of Britishness 
(see Stenner 2005 and Haidt 2016 for how the globalist-nationalist divide can activate authoritarian 
predispositions that in more settled time are passive and latent). 
	
Full results of an LPA on three indicators of authoritarianism appear in the Online Appendix, but 
similar to the Nationalism-Globalism posture, the UK electorate divides into three profiles. 
Approximately 1 in 10 voters (9.8%) are “Permissive” on this scale, having mean scores suggesting 
disagreement that learning obedience and respect is important for children, scepticism that learning 
about customs and heritage is important for people, and opposing the corporal punishment of children. 
Just under 4 in 10 citizens (38.7%) fit a more “Moderate” profile, slightly more opposed on average to 
physically punishing children but slightly more supportive than not of teaching obedience and respect 
and valuing heritage and customs. A large 51.5% of the British sample have average positions near 
the high extreme of the scale, leading to their classification as “Authoritarians”. 
 
Those in the small Permissive Authoritarianism profile are far more likely to be Globalists in their 
policy orientation. In the five-indicator profile analysis, they comprise less than 10% of the sample 
but account for 41% of those classified as Globalists. Authoritarians comprise just over half the 
sample (52%), but 80% and 83% of Authoritarians reside in the four and five indicator Nationalist 
profiles. Respondents’ policy outlooks link to core apolitical predispositions.13 
 
Table 2 reports a multinomial logit estimation of profile membership onto key demographics, 
occupational status, Eurosceptic press readership, and authoritarian profile membership. In the five-
indicator LPA, the move to an Authoritarian profile shifts the probability of having a Globalist 
outlook to only 2%, but shifting to a Permissive profile improves the probability of a Globalist 
classification to 32%. The baseline respondent has a 17% probability of being in the Nationalist 
profile.  Chances shift to only 6% if the respondent moves a Permissive profile and increases to 44% 
if the respondent has an Authoritarian orientation. A permissive, university graduate, non-Eurosceptic 
press reading, manager has a simulated probability of 46% of falling into a Globalist profile and only 
a 2% probability of falling into the Nationalist profile. An Authoritarian, working class, Eurosceptic 
newspaper reading individual has an extremely low 0.2% estimated chance of classification as a 
Globalist but a 58% chance of a Nationalist classification. Papers read, class, educational status and 
authoritarian predisposition have a marked relationship with policy orientations.14 
 
 
VI. The Political Consequences of the Globalist-Nationalist Policy Divide 
Voting and Elections: Above results show a clear linkage between the Globalist-Nationalist policy 
divide among the British electorate and demographic differences and authoritarian predispositions. 
																																								 																				
fashioned physical punishment is still one of the best ways to make people behave properly” (authoritarian 
aggression). 
13 In turn, the authoritarian predisposition links to other apolitical scales such as ones measuring “Big 5” 
personality traits (see Sibley and Duckitt 2008).  Simulations below utilize the CLARIFY package for Stata v.14 
(Tomz et al. 2003). 
14 The relationship between the Nationalist-Globalist posture and Eurosceptic press readership likely contains a 
degree of endogeneity as does the relationship between media choice and voting behaviour in the General 
Election and EU Referendum.  We include this variable because we wish to emphasize that, controlling for 
media consumption, the relationship between and the posture and political choice still obtains.   
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This section addresses whether this policy divide is politically consequential, manifesting itself in 
voting behaviour and in respondents’ satisfaction with democracy. 
 
Recent analyses of British electoral choice (cf. Clarke et al. 2004; 2009; Whiteley et al. 2013) give 
pride of place on the explanatory power so-called valence forces have in determining voter choice. 
Close to the vote, valence factors are non-ideological in nature and include identification with the 
parties, reactions to the party leaders and views about performance of the national economy. In Table 
3, we estimate a multinomial logit model distinguishing between the voter’s choice between the 
Conservatives, UKIP, and the Liberal Democrats/Labour that include the key valence factors of 
attitudes towards the four party leaders, retrospective economic evaluations and demographic 
controls. We add additional dichotomous variables placing the respondent into their most likely 
Globalist-Nationalist policy profile.15 
 
The valence factors perform well, but their inclusion does not negate a distinct role for one’s policy 
profile. A male, non-university educated, working class respondent with average feeling thermometer 
evaluations of each party leader and the performance of the economy is estimated to have 13% and 
15% chances of voting Tory and 8% and 12% chances of voting UKIP in the four and five indicator 
models, respectively. Moving the respondent away from the Moderate Globalist and Moderate 
profiles and into the Nationalist profiles increases the probability of a Conservative choice to 16% in 
both the four and five indicator models. UKIP’s chances increase to 19% in both models. Additional 
simulations shifting differences hypothetical respondents’ feelings about UKIP leader Nigel Farage 
and Conservative Leader David Cameron suggest that in most circumstances, UKIP sees a greater 
gain than the Tories when respondents move to having a Nationalist policy profile.  
 
Next, we consider intended vote in the EU referendum circa early spring 2015, which divided the 
sample nearly evenly with 43% stating they would vote “Remain” and 40% stating they would 
“Leave”. Undecided were 17%, and Table 4 looks at the factors that shift respondents away from 
ambivalence to a Stay or Leave position.16 This estimation adds the Globalist-Nationalist Profile of 
the respondent to control variables frequently identified as correlates of EU referendum voting.  These 
are partisan identification, Eurosceptic Press readership, and economic evaluations. Included as 
controls are respondents’ level of agreement with three statements (of varying accuracy) concerning 
the European Union: 1) that the EU sells more goods to Britain than vice versa; 2) that European 
MEPs are paid more than UK Members of Parliament; and 3) that Britain pays a much higher 
contribution to the EU than it should. 
 
Results displayed in Table 3 are telling as the placement of a respondent into one of the three profiles 
in either model is, in many instances just as potent as partisan identification or more proximate 
attitudes towards the European Union. In the model with the four indicator profile, a non-partisan, 
non-graduate male respondent residing outside of London, Scotland, or Wales with average attitudes 
towards national economic performance and on the specific European questions is simulated to have a 
41% of intending to vote “Remain”, 28% chance of wanting to “Leave” and a 31% chance of being 
undecided. In the five-indicator model, the percentages are 33% in each category. Shifting the 
respondent to a Nationalist profile increases the probability of a “Leave” response to 49% and 51% in 
																																								 																				
15 For ease of presentation, Labour/Liberal Democrats combine into a single category. Respondents stating they 
did not intend to vote, vote for one of the nationalist (the Scottish Nationalist Party or Plaid Cymyu) or minor 
parties do not appear in this analysis. A model replacing party leader feeling thermometers with respondents’ 
partisan identification produces similar results to the model presented in the text—results available in the Online 
Appendix.  
16 We exclude respondents who said they would not vote in the referendum from Table 3 analyses.  Respondents 
who answer both the March 2014 and spring 2015 waves of the study appear in this analysis.  Questions 
pertaining to the European Union in the analyses appear in the spring 2015 wave. 
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the models with four and five indicators and this comes primarily at the expense of the “Remain” 
choice. In the four-indicator model, if the respondent instead moves from the Moderate Globalist 
Profile into the Anti-Immigrant Nationalist Profile, the simulated probability of choosing “Leave” 
increases to 42%. For the model with the five indicator LPA, moving from a Moderate to a Globalist 
profile increases the choosing Remain to 65% and decreases choosing Leave to only 17%.   
 
To provide an idea of the potency of the effects of shifting away from the Moderate profiles, 
additional simulations show that moving our baseline respondent from no partisan identification to 
supporting UKIP shifts the probability for leave to greater than 70%.  Moving to supporting the 
Liberal Democrats produces a strong shift towards Remain. However, the effects of shifting to the 
Globalist profile is stronger than the effect of moving from non-identification to Labour and 
movement into Nationalism has more of an influence than shifting towards identification with the 
Conservatives. This shift is stronger than moving the respondent into a category that has them reading 
one of the Eurosceptic papers. The effect of moving the respondent from “Strongly Disagreeing” that 
the UK Pays More than it Should into the European Union to a “Strongly Agree” produces a shift in 
the leave direction of approximately 40% for our hypothetical respondent. Shifts observed from 
moving from Strongly Disagreeing to Strongly Agreeing on the other two statements directly 
referencing the European Union produce smaller shifts than moving the respondent from the four and 
five indicator Moderate to Nationalist profiles. Broad based Nationalist-Globalist policy positions are 
relevant to the decision to leave or remain in the EU and they trump some measures considered 
proximate to the referendum decision. 
 
Democracy: The Nationalist-Globalist policy positioning of citizens is central to voter choice in 
recent British elections, but can also shape views of overall system. People supporting losing parties 
and candidates often show lower levels of satisfaction with democracy then those backing winners 
(Anderson and Guillory 1997). We hypothesise that Nationalists, who are policy “losers” in an era 
where globalisation dominates are likely to express lower levels of democratic satisfaction.  
 
Table 5 presents results of a logit estimation differentiating respondents who express “satisfaction 
with the way democracy works in Britain” (coded 1) with those who either do not or are ambivalent.17 
In addition to binary variables for the Nationalist/Globalist profiles, controls for partisan 
identification, media consumption, and internal and external political efficacy are included. 
Nationalists are less likely to report satisfaction with democracy in Britain than their Moderate and 
Moderate Globalist counterparts. By way of illustration, a respondent with the demographic 
characteristics of the above baseline respondent but who is a Labour partisan is in both the four and 
five indicator models simulated to have an approximately 50-50 chance of reporting that they are 
either “Very” or “Fairly” satisfied with the way democracy works in the country. Moving the 
respondent from the Moderate Globalist or Moderate profile to the Nationalist profile reduces the 
probability of indicating satisfaction by approximately 10%. This approximates the reduction we see 
if the respondent moves from an average to a minimum position on the internal efficacy factor. 
Interestingly, Globalists are no more satisfied with democratic performance than are Moderates.   
 
VII. Discussion 
In the aftermath of the “Great Recession,” many British citizens still reel from financial ramifications 
linked to the near collapse of the global economy, have difficulty coping with rapid technological 
change, and live in a society where success depends on mobility.  A small minority of Britons have 
																																								 																				
17 The “Satisfaction with Democracy” question appears in the May/June 2014 wave of the panel, coming shortly 
after the May 22 elections to the EU Parliament. Only 5% of the sample state that they are “Very Satisfied” but 
46% state that they are “Fairly Satisfied” with democratic performance in the UK. Consequently, this estimation 
includes only respondents who answered these two waves as well as the larger March 2014 wave. 
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the globalist outlook, which embraces international cooperation and is open to changes brought about 
by immigration and the state facilitating opportunities for once marginalised groups.  However, most 
oppose this “citizen of the world” outlook.  Nationalists are less open to state intervention than those 
with a globalist outlook are, but our empirical analyses suggest they fall far short of blindly embracing 
global neoliberalism.18  
 
The ability of attitudes on various aspects of the globalist-nationalist cleavage to cluster in 
contemporary Britain differs from that observed at the height of Thatcherism.  It is possible to classify 
the contemporary British electorate by a relatively small number of profiles, and the profiles have 
demographic correlates.  Although far from deterministic, those eschewing nationalist policy type 
postures predominantly are university graduates in leading occupational positions with permissive 
positions on an authoritarianism scale.    
 
A globalist-nationalist policy divide among the UK electorate has ramifications both for how citizens 
vote and for health of the democratic polity.19  In recent decades, it became passé to harp on 
sociological differences in political choice.  Valence factors explain political outcomes when the lines 
of political conflict are established (e.g. Clarke et al. 2004).  However, the post-2008 political world is 
deeply unsettled and economic changes on the horizon will make it even less so with politicians 
unable to offer viable solutions regardless of their stated desires to “take back control” (Frankel 
2016).  Support for parties and political choice in recent elections does not come down merely to 
charismatic leaders and economic evaluations.  To win in contemporary Britain, politicians both left 
and right have to capture the nationalist issue space, and we witnessed this in the recent referendum 
campaigns and two 2015 and 2017 General Elections.    
 
That the globalist-nationalist posture goes beyond explaining political choice to affect satisfaction 
with democracy does not surprise.  The distribution on this core policy posture suggests globalists are 
a small coterie of the populace, university educated and in professional occupations, making the rules 
for an electorate where the median voter leans in a nationalist direction, with at least 1 in 5 residing on 
a hard nationalist posture.   
 
What remains to be seen is whether the electoral choices of the UK electorate in the 2015 and 2017 
General Election and 2016 Referendum campaigns gives voice to enough people to allow levels of 
democratic satisfaction rise.  Pronouncements of Prime Minister Theresa May at the 2016 
Conservative Party Conference and the initial hard lines the Government drew in early Brexit 
negotiations appears aimed at assuaging the new nationalist sentiment.    
 
Insurgent and successful Labour Leader Jeremy Corbyn muted differences his Party had on the 
nationalist-globalist divide with those of the Tories during the 2017 campaign.  However, the 
expectations and hopes of the portion of the electorate wishing to see policy move in an anti-globalist 
direction can go unfulfilled.  Globalisation is a powerful force and even those in the Government with 
a nationalist “UK First” bent may have to make pragmatic choices (MacShane 2016).  Should Brexit 
and accompanying ancillary efforts fizzle, a question is whether this posture may become more salient 
in driving party choice, perhaps dampening further democratic satisfaction and attitudes towards 
political institutions.     
																																								 																				
18	Concerns over economic globalism extend beyond the selected “Government getting out of the business of 
promoting income equality” indicator.  A question on the panel asking whether trade should be an EU or a 
national responsibility reveal that 58% wished the UK to retain authority against the 30% who were comfortable 
with ceding power to the EU. 
19 Although space prohibits a full exploration, estimates contained in the Online Appendix suggest that the 
Nationalist-Globalist posture affects the way citizens view institutions such as the judiciary.	
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VIII. Conclusion 
A simplistic characterisation of post-war British political history is one where a small number of 
elections set the ideological agenda and, for long periods, leader competence to manage the political 
programme determined the outcome of elections.  The 1945 victory of Clement Attlee’s Labour Party 
cemented the notion that the British electorate favoured a generous welfare state.  With the welfare 
state created, parties and leaders spent much of the 1950s and 1960s debating who could serve the 
electorate better in fashioning and providing generous benefits.  Union unrest and economic 
uncertainty due to high inflation called into question the consensus over the Governments’ abilities to 
manage centrally the national economy (King 1975).   
 
The Thatcher victory of 1979 smashed once widespread agreement surrounding the utility of a vast 
welfare state, and the calamitous defeat of Michael Foot’s fragmented Labour party in 1983 was a 
further nail in the coffin.  From this period to the economic crisis of 2008, politics centred on debates 
over effective management of a society where semi-privatized public services and industries were 
increasingly not under the direct control of the state.  In this era, bargaining powers of workers 
weakened, and the British economy increasingly was subjected to the “golden straightjacket” 
(Friedman 1999) of global capital and multinational corporations (Bogdanor 2006).   
 
Post-Thatcher, the question of British politics was management of the globalised “new normal.” 
When Thatcher went from “resolute and determined” to “stubborn and inflexible” (Denver 2011: 87), 
John Major replaced her.  When voters poorly assessed his leadership capabilities in stepped Tony 
Blair.  The Labour Leader to paraphrase Chris Dillow (2007), aimed to govern efficiently with a 
mandate towards promoting equality and a centrist political agenda.  The assumption was that good 
management could replace the divisive left-right ideological politics that characterised the early 
Thatcher years and saw Labour in the doldrums.  Unfortunately, for technocrats and many globalists, 
policies and their implementation often involve trade-offs.  
  
Brexit muted the EU as a voting issue.  Jeremy Corbyn’s proved surprisingly deft at making peace 
with the need for immigration restrictions, downplayed his dovishness on military matters, and kept 
Labour’s “true” position on Brexit muddled during the 2017 General Election campaign.  
Underappreciated by pundits was Corbyn’s Labour’s shift in the direction matching mean positions of 
the nationalist profiles on matters of cultural and justice globalism.  His personal characteristics aside, 
Corbyn’s positions likely were palatable to anxious nationalist voters.  Parties embracing globalism, 
the Liberal Democrats and Scottish National Party, underperformed in the 2017 General Election.    
 
Corbyn’s Labour has established credibility on economic nationalism—unlike “New Labour”, nobody 
could claim Corbyn and his front bench allies have any sympathy for a globalised neo-liberalism.  
Brexit helps to fulfil the electorate’s preferences on cultural and justice nationalism, but does little to 
present an alternative to economic globalism to the financially hard-pressed British public.  Although 
heavily criticised, the economic vision projected by Jeremy Corbyn seems more in tune with the 
preferences of the British electorate than Theresa May. 
 
In a weak economy with Brexit looming, it remains to be seen whether even a Labour Government 
can allay voter anxieties via redistributive policies that build up the skills and hopes of the “left 
behinds”.  Even with a renewed government focus on tempering the negatives associated with global 
neoliberalism, the question for nationalists likely will turn to whether or not they benefit from 
redistributive policies.  The perception is that benefits flow disproportionately to immigrants and 
those on board with the so-called equal rights agenda.  In the wake of two divisive General Elections 
and a Referendum, the consequences of not addressing the problem of status anxiety and the declining 
relative position of a large portion of the electorate seem clear.  We may be moving into an era where 
13	
	
elections hinge on an unsettled nationalist-globalist cleavage, one without a crosscutting alternative, 
and the debate centres around increasingly negative variants of the “thin ideology” of nationalism 
rather than on the valenced decision of choosing the politician who best can deliver on shared and 
consensual objectives. 
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Table	1:	Latent	Profile	Analysis	of	UK	Respondents	Based	on	Four	and	Five	Indicator	Models	of	
Nationalism/Anti-Cosmopolitanism	
Profile	 %	in	
Profile	
Most	
Likely	Class	
by	Latent	
Class	
(Diagonals)	
Income	
Inequality	
Equal	
Rights	
Halt	
Immigration	
Strong	
Military	
Stop	Taking	
Orders	From	
International	
Organizations	
Four	
Indicators:	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Profile	1	
(Moderate	
Globalist)	
46.6%	 92.9%	 	 2.58	 2.16	 3.12	 3.21	
Profile	2	
(Nationalist)	
24.9%	 84.8%	 	 4.54	 3.99	 4.32	 4.54	
Profile	3	
(Anti-
Immigrant	
Moderate	
Nationalist)	
28.5%	 80.3%	 	 3.43	 4.54	 3.62	 4.03	
Five	
Indicators:	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Profile	1	
(Globalist)	
11.0%	 92.4%	 1.21	 1.40	 1.45	 2.66	 2.65	
Profile	2	
(Nationalist)	
28.9%	 88.3%	 4.01	 4.12	 4.71	 4.21	 4.54	
Profile	3	
(Moderate)	
60.1%	 91.2%	 3.53	 3.21	 2.96	 3.38	 3.58	
Note:	Latent	profile	analysis	conducted	in	Mplus	v7.4	with	Robust	Maximum	Likelihood	Estimation.		
Sample	Size	Adjusted	BIC	for	Four	Indicator	Solution:	57446.29	(Best	likelihood	value:		-28653.673).	
Sample	Size	Adjusted	BIC	for	Five	Indicator	Solution:	75853.91	(Best	likelihood	value:	-37841.167).		
Effective	weighted	sample	size	for	Four	Indicator	Solution:	5023;	Effective	weighted	sample	size	for	
Five	Indicator	Solution:	5112.	
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Table	2:		Multinomial	Logit	Estimations	Predicting	Most	Likely	Profile	Membership	
	
	 Four	Indicator:	 Five	Indicator:	
	 Moderate	Globalist	
v.	Nationalist	
Moderate	Globalist	
v.	Anti-Immigrant/	
Moderate	
Nationalist	
Moderate	v.	
Globalist	
Moderate	v.	
Nationalist	
Basic	
Demographics:	
	 	 	 	 	
Male	 -0.23	
(0.16)	
-0.40*	
(0.15)	
-0.29	
(0.23)	
-0.43**	
(0.14)	
Age	 0.00	
(0.01)	
0.01	
(0.01)	
0.02*	
(0.01)	
0.01*	
(0.00)	
Non-White/	Non-
British	Origin	
-0.17	
(0.28)	
-0.43	
(0.30)	
0.26	
(0.34)	
0.36	
(0.26)	
University	
Graduate	
-0.47**	
(0.18)	
-0.54***	
(0.18)	
0.87***	
(0.26)	
-0.41*	
(0.17)	
Occupation:	 	 	 	 	
Professional/		
Manager	
-0.14	
(0.18)	
-0.60***	
(0.18)	
-0.33	
(0.25)	
-0.46**	
(0.17)	
Public	Sector	 0.37	
(0.28)	
-0.18	
(0.25)	
0.04	
(0.41)	
0.27	
(0.23)	
Private	Sector	 0.28	
(0.29)	
-0.17	
(0.26)	
0.26	
(0.45)	
0.10	
(0.23)	
Interface	Sector	 -0.33	
(0.23)	
-0.04	
(0.22)	
-0.02	
(0.32)	
-0.37	
(0.20)	
Trade	Union	 -0.24	
(0.29)	
0.11	
(0.25)	
0.52	
(0.29)	
-0.71*	
(0.29)	
Region:	 	 	 	 	
London	 -0.17	
(0.24)	
-0.23	
(0.25)	
0.60	
(0.31)	
-0.04	
(0.22)	
Scotland	 -0.60*	
(0.29)	
-0.08	
(0.25)	
-0.72	
(0.41)	
-0.41	
(0.26)	
Wales	 -1.03*	
(0.44)	
0.08	
(0.31)	
0.26	
(0.42)	
-0.75*	
(0.36)	
News:	 	
	 	 	
Reads	Eurosceptic	
Press	
1.04***	
(0.16)	
0.50**	
(0.16)	
-2.06***	
(0.47)	
0.55***	
(0.14)	
Authoritarian	
Profile:	 	 	 	 	
Permissive	 -1.45**	
(0.49)	
-1.18***	
(0.35)	
1.52***	
(0.27)	
-0.96	
(0.56)	
Authoritarian	 1.47***	
(0.17)	
0.70***	
(0.16)	
-1.15***	
(0.30)	
1.33***	
(0.16)	
Constant:	 -1.32**	
(0.42)	
-0.40	
(0.39)	
-2.80***	
(0.64)	
-1.65***	
(0.35)	
Notes:		Wave	1	respondents	only.		Sample	Size	for	Four	Indicator	Model=1,382;	Sample	Size	for	Five	Indicator	
Model=1,396.	Four	Indicator	Model	Likelihood	Ratio	χ2(28df):	378.31;		Five	Indicator	Model	Likelihood	Ratio	
χ2(30df):	484.24.		***p<0.001;	**p<0.01;	*	p<0.05.	
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Table	3:		Multinomial	Logit	Estimations	Predicting	Voter	Support	for	UKIP	and	the	Conservatives	
	 Four	Indicator:	 Five	Indicator:	
	 Labour/LibDem	v.	
Conservative	
Labour/LibDem	v.	
UKIP	
Labour/LibDem	v.	
Conservative	
Labour/LibDem	v.	
UKIP	
Globalist/	
Nationalist	Profile:	
	 	 	 	 	
Nationalist	 0.37	
(0.27)	
1.10***	
(0.26)	
0.19	
(0.20)	
0.59***	
(0.20)	
Anti-Immigrant	
Nationalist	
0.32	
(0.21)	
1.17***	
(0.25)	
XX	
	
XX	
	
Globalist	 XX	
	
XX	
	
-1.58**	
(0.56)	
-3.28	
(1.51)	
Leader	
Thermometers:	 	 	 	 	
David	Cameron	 0.97***	
(0.05)	
0.22***	
(0.05)	
0.96***	
(0.05)	
0.20***	
(0.05)	
Edward	Miliband	 -0.74***	
(0.05)	
-0.72***	
(0.05)	
-0.73***	
(0.04)	
-0.71***	
(0.05)	
Nick	Clegg	 -0.38***	
(0.28)	
-0.34***	
(0.04)	
-0.37***	
(0.05)	
-0.34***	
(0.05)	
Nigel	Farage	 0.14***	
(0.40)	
0.78***	
(0.05)	
0.14***	
(0.04)	
0.78***	
(0.23)	
Economic	
Perceptions:	
-0.33	
(0.23)	
-0.04	
(0.22)	
-0.02	
(0.32)	
-0.37	
(0.20)	
National	
Performance	
0.28**	
(0.10)	
-0.15	
(0.10)	
0.26*	
(0.10)	
-0.18	
(0.10)	
Constant:	 -3.01***	
(0.56)	
-1.99***	
(0.59)	
-2.78***	
(0.56)	
-1.38*	
(0.57)	
Notes:		Demographic,	Occupational,	and	Regional	controls	present	in	Table	6	included	in	estimations	but	not	
shown	due	to	space	considerations.		Data	from	March	2014	wave	of	the	survey.		Sample	Size	for	both	
estimates:	2,618.		Four	Indicator	Model	Likelihood	Ratio	χ2(38df):	3319.16;		Five	Indicator	Model	Likelihood	
Ratio	χ2(38df):	3321.38.		***p<0.001;	**p<0.01;	*	p<0.05.	
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Table	4:		Multinomial	Logit	Estimations	Predicting	EU	Referendum	Choice	
	
	 Four	Indicator:	 Five	Indicator:	
	 Don’t	Know	v.	
Remain	
Don’t	Know	v.	
Leave	
Don’t	Know	v.	
Remain	
Don’t	Know	v.	
Leave	
Globalist/	
Nationalist	Profile:	
	 	 	 	 	
Nationalist	 -0.46*	
(0.18)	
0.64***	
(0.18)	
-0.32	
(0.17)	
0.63***	
(0.15)	
Anti-Immigrant	
Nationalist	
-0.54***	
(0.16)	
0.34*	
(0.16)	
XX	
	
XX	
	
Globalist	 XX	
	
XX	
	
1.15***	
(0.24)	
-0.19	
(0.34)	
Party	
Identification:	 	 	 	 	
Conservative	 0.29	
(0.19)	
0.28	
(0.19)	
0.32	
(0.19)	
0.32	
(0.19)	
Labour	 0.82***	
(0.16)	
0.19	
(0.17)	
0.81***	
(0.16)	
0.22	
(0.17)	
Liberal	Democrat	 1.54***	
(0.31)	
0.82*	
(0.35)	
1.59***	
(0.31)	
0.87*	
(0.34)	
UKIP	 -0.41	
(0.51)	
1.71***	
(0.36)	
-0.37	
(0.51)	
1.76***	
(0.36)	
Economic	
Perceptions:	 	 	 	 	
National	
Performance	
0.20**	
(0.07)	
-0.04	
(0.07)	
0.23***	
(0.07)	
-0.02	
(0.07)	
EU	Attitudes:	 	 	 	 	
EU	Sells	More	
Goods	
0.03	
(0.08)	
0.24**	
(0.08)	
0.01	
(0.08)	
0.22**	
(0.08)	
EU	MEPs	Paid	
More	
-0.11	
(0.08)	
0.17*	
(0.08)	
-0.12	
(0.08)	
0.17*	
(0.08)	
UK	Contributes	Too	
Much	to	EU	
-0.21**	
(0.07)	
0.51***	
(0.08)	
-0.17*	
(0.07)	
0.51***	
(0.08)	
Newspaper:	 	 	 	 	
Reads	Eurosceptic	
Press	
-0.13	
(0.14)	
0.53***	
(0.14)	
-0.06	
(0.14)	
0.52***	
(0.14)	
Constant:	 -0.60	
(0.48)	
-4.88***	
(0.51)	
-1.05*	
(0.49)	
-4.88***	
(0.52)	
Notes:		Demographic,	Occupational,	and	Regional	controls	present	in	Table	6	included	in	estimations	but	not	
shown	due	to	space	considerations.		Data	from	March	2014	and	April	2015	waves	of	the	survey.		Sample	Size	
for	both	estimates:	2,378.		Four	Indicator	Model	Likelihood	Ratio	χ2(46df):	1131.02;		Five	Indicator	Model	
Likelihood	Ratio	χ2(46df):	1170.23.		***p<0.001;	**p<0.01;	*	p<0.05.	
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Table	5:		Globalism/Nationalism	and	Satisfaction	with	Democracy	
	
	 Four	Indicator:	 Five	Indicator	
	 Satisfaction	with	Democracy	 Satisfaction	with	Democracy	
Globalist/	
Nationalist	Profile:	
	 	 	
Nationalist	 -0.41*	
(0.18)	
-0.34***	
(0.16)	
Anti-Immigrant	
Nationalist	
-0.20	
(0.17)	
XX	
	
Globalist	 XX	
	
-0.12	
(0.23)	
Party	
Identification:	 	 	
Conservative	 1,07***	
(0.20)	
1.02***	
(0.20)	
Labour	 1.02***	
(0.18)	
1.02***	
(0.18)	
Liberal	Democrat	 0.72**	
(0.27)	
0.74**	
(0.27)	
UKIP	 -0.45	
(0.33)	
-0.49	
(0.33)	
Economic	
Perceptions:	 	 	
National	
Performance	
0.43***	
(0.07)	
0.42***	
(0.07)	
Efficacy:	 	 	
Internal	Efficacy	 -0.16	
(0.08)	
-0.14	
(0.08)	
External	Efficacy	 -0.49***	
(0.09)	
-0.49***	
(0.09)	
Newspaper:	 	 	
Reads	Eurosceptic	
Press	
-0.07	
(0.16)	
0.05	
(0.16)	
Constant:	 -2.77***	
(0.45)	
-2.77***	
(0.45)	
Notes:		Demographic,	Occupational,	and	Regional	controls	present	in	Table	6	included	in	estimations	but	not	
shown	due	to	space	considerations.		Data	from	March	2014	and	April	2015	waves	of	the	survey.		Sample	Size	
for	both	estimates:	1,126.		Four	Indicator	Model	Likelihood	Ratio	χ2(22df):	225.20;		Five	Indicator	Model	
Likelihood	Ratio	χ2(22df):	224.68.		***p<0.001;	**p<0.01;	*	p<0.05.	
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Online	Appendix:	
Appendix	Table	1:		Measures	of	the	Five	Components	of	Nationalism/Anti-Cosmopolitanism	
Note:		In	Latent	Profile	Analysis,	Missing	Data	Imputed	via	Mplus’s	Robust	Maximum	Likelihood	
Algorithim.	Full	N=5125.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 Mean	
(Standard	Deviation)	
Range	 Weighted	N*	
Not	Government’s	Business	to	Promote	
Income	Equality?	
3.53	
(1.05)	
1-5	 4788	
Gone	too	Far	In	Pushing	Equal	Rights?	 3.75	
(1.04)	
1-5	 4796	
All	Immigration	to	the	UK	Should	be	
Halted?	
3.29	
(1.38)	
1-5	 4901	
UK	Needs	Strong	Military	to	Be	Effective	
In	International	Relations	
3.27	
(1.28)	
1-5	 4853	
UK	Doesn’t	Need	to	Withdraw	from	
International	Affairs,	Just	Need	to	Stop	
Allowing	International	Organisations	
Telling	Us	What	We	Can	and	Can’t	Do	
3.41	
(1.80)	
1-7	 5079	
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Appendix	Table	2:		Confirmatory	Factor	Analysis	of	Components	of	Nationalism/Anti-
Cosmopolitanism	
	 Five	Indicators	
Loadings	
Indicator	R2	 Four	Indicator	
Loadings	
Indicator	R2	
Not	
Government’s	
Business	to	
Promote	Income	
Equality	
0.36	 0.13	 --	 --	
Gone	Too	Far	in	
Pushing	Equal	
Rights	
0.68	 0.46	 0.68	 0.46	
All	Immigration	
to	the	UK	Should	
Be	Halted	
0.75	 0.57	 0.76	 0.57	
UK	Needs	Strong	
Military	to	Be	
Effective	in	
International	
Relations	
0.49	 0.25	 0.49	 0.24	
UK	Doesn’t	Need	
To	Withdraw	
from	
International	
Affairs,	Just	Need	
to	Stop	Allowing	
International	
Organisations	
Telling	Us	What	
We	Can	and	
Can’t	Do	
0.64	 0.41	 0.64	 0.41	
Notes:		Indicators	Treated	as	Ordinal,	WLSMV	Estimator	Employed.		For	Estimation	with	Five	
Indicators,	Significant	Correlated	Errors	Were	Observed	Between	the	Income	Equality	and	Equal	
Rights	and	Strong	Military	and	Withdrawal	from	International	Affairs	Indicators.		For	Estimation	with	
Four	Indicators,	Significant	Correlated	Errors	Were	Observed	Between	the	Strong	Military	and	
Withdrawal	from	International	Affairs	Indicators.		Model	Fit	Statistics	for	the	Five	Indicator	CFA:	
χ2WLSMV=10.03	(3df);	p=0.02;	RMSEA=0.02;	CFI=0.999.	Model	Fit	Statistics	for	the	Four	Indicator	CFA:	
χ2WLSMV=0.19(1df);	p=0.66;	RMSEA=0.001;	CFI=1.00.	
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Appendix	Table	3:		Attempted	Confirmatory	Factor	Analysis	of	Components	of	Nationalism/Anti-
Cosmopolitanism	Utilizing	Indicators	on	the	1983	BES	
	 Four	Indicator	
Loadings	
Indicator	R2	
Agree	that	
Wealth	Needs	
Redistributing	
(Reverse	Coded)		
0.52	 0.27	
Gone	Too	Far	in	
Cutting	
Commonwealth	
Immigration	
(Reverse	Coded)	
0.16	 0.03	
Agree—Gone	too	
Far	in	Ensuring	
Equal	
Opportunities	to	
Blacks	and	Asians	
in	Britain	
0.17	 0.03	
Agree--British	
Nuclear	Weapons	
Keep	Us	Safe	
0.70	 0.49	
Notes:		Indicators	Treated	as	Ordinal,	WLSMV	Estimator	Employed.	Significant	Correlated	Errors	
Were	Observed	Between	the	Two	“Gone	too	Far”	Indicators.		Model	Fit	Statistics	CFA:	χ2WLSMV=0.65	
(1df);	p=0.42;	RMSEA=0.00;	CFI=0.999.	Unfortunately,	the	items	available	for	the	1983	analysis	do	
not	match	exactly	to	our	main	dataset.	However,	these	are	conceptually	similar	items.	The	CFA	
employing	the	1983	dataset	include	indicators	asking	whether	respondents	agreed	that	too	much	
effort	went	into	ensuring	equality	for	“blacks	and	Asians”;	that	wealth	needs	redistributing	(reverse	
coded);	British	nuclear	weapons	ensure	safety;	and	whether	cuts	to	immigration	from	
Commonwealth	countries	had	gone	too	far	(reverse	coded).	The	single	factor	model	fits	the	data	but	
only	explains	significant	variation	for	the	two	foreign	policy	items.	The	substitution	of	a	limited	
number	of	other	indicators	(e.g.	a	question	on	defence	spending)	yielded	similar	results.	
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Appendix	Table	4:		The	Demographic	Profile	of	Globalism/Nationalism	in	Britain	
Demographic	 Four	Indicator:	 Five	Indicator:	
	 Moderate	
Globalist	
(46.6%)	
Nationalist	
(24.9%)	
Anti-
Immigrant/	
Moderate	
Nationalist	
(28.5%)	
Globalist	
(11.0%)	
Nationalist	
(28.9%)	
Moderate	
(60.1%)	
Male	 49.9%	 25.7	 24.4	 11.6%	 26.8	 61.6	
Female	 43.5%	 24.0	 32.4	 10.5%	 30.9	 58.6	
Age	Over	65	 36.6%	 34.6	 28.9	 7.7%	 36.7	 55.6	
Age	51-65	 40.7%	 28.5	 30.9	 10.2	 34.4	 55.4	
Age	31-50	 49.5%	 20.7	 29.8	 10.4%	 25.3	 65.3	
Age	18-30	 62.0%	 16.2	 21.9	 16.6%	 18.6	 64.7	
White	British	 44.7%	 25.4	 29.9	 10.5%	 30.2	 59.4	
Non-White	and/or	Non-
British	
64.2%	 19.7	 16.1	 16.7%	 18.0	 66.3	
University	Degree	 59.0%	 19.8	 20.7	 16.8%	 19.0	 64.2	
No	University	Degree	 38.1%	 28.2	 33.8	 7.2%	 35.4	 57.4	
Management/Professional	
Class	
57.3%	 22.0	 20.7	 14.6%	 20.9	 64.5	
Working	Class	 38.3%	 27.2	 34.6	 8.1%	 34.4	 57.5	
Public	Sector	 50.0%	 25.4	 24.6	 13.2%	 25.7	 61.1	
Private	Sector	Non-
Managerial	
42.8%	 28.2	 29.1	 8.4%	 31.4	 60.2	
Interface	(Third)	 53.7%	 17.8	 28.5	 14.7%	 24.2	 61.2	
Trade	Union	Member	 56.1%	 21.9	 22.0	 23.3%	 20.5	 56.2	
Region:	 	 	 	 	 	 	
North	East	 41.9%	 23.8	 34.3	 8.9%	 34.2	 56.9	
North	West	 43.4%	 24.1	 32.3	 10.0.%	 31.5	 58.4	
Yorkshire	and	Humber	 45.5%	 26.6	 27.9	 11.3%	 32.9	 55.8	
East	Midlands	 43.7%	 26.7	 29.5	 10.5%	 29.1	 60.4	
West	Midlands	 44.9%	 23.9	 31.2	 6.7%	 27.0	 61.3	
East	of	England	 39.1%	 29.0	 31.8	 8.8%	 35.7	 55.5	
London	 56.6%	 21.5	 21.9	 14.5%	 22.3	 63.2	
South	East	 44.0%	 27.5	 28.5	 10.6%	 30.8	 58.6	
South	West	 46.0%	 25.8	 28.2	 13.2%	 27.2	 64.5	
Wales	 52.3%	 21.7	 26.0	 8.0%	 27.2	 64.5	
Scotland	 53.9%	 20.6	 25.5	 15.2%	 22.3	 62.5	
Populist	Newspaper	
Readership	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Reads	a	Populist	
Newspaper	
31.0%	 35.8	 33.3	 2.5%	 41.6	 56.1	
Does	Not	Read	a	Populist	
Newspaper	
56.8%	 17.8	 25.4	 16.6%	 20.8	 62.6	
Note:		Weighted	Sample	Size	N=5,023	
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Appendix	Table	5:		Latent	Profile	Analysis	of	Three	Authoritarianism	Indicators	
Profile	 %	in	
Profile	
Most	
Likely	Class	
by	Latent	
Class	
(Diagonals)	
Obedience	
and	
Respect	
for	
Authority	
Important	
for	
Children	
Customs	
and	
National	
Heritage	
Made	
Us	
Great,	
People	
Should	
Respect	
Physical	
Punishment	
Best	Way	to	
Make	
People	
Behave	
Three	
Indicators:	
	 	 	 	 	
Profile	1	
(Permissive)	
9.8%	 92.0%	 1.95	 2.08	 1.54	
Profile	2	
(Moderate)	
38.7%	 82.6%	 3.59	 3.56	 2.79	
Profile	3	
(Authoritarian)	
51.5%	 92.3%	 4.59	 4.59	 4.03	
Note:	Latent	profile	analysis	conducted	in	Mplus	v7.4	with	Robust	Maximum	Likelihood	Estimation.		
Sample	Size	Adjusted	BIC	for	Four	Indicator	Solution:	22171.90	(Best	likelihood	value:		-11052.730)	
Effective	weighted	sample	size:	2760	
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Appendix	Table	6:		Cross-Tabulations	between	Globalism/Nationalism	and	Traditional	
Authoritarianism	in	Britain	
	
	 Authoritarianism:	
	 Permissive	
(9.8%)	
Moderate	
(38.7%)	
Authoritarian	
(51.5%)	
Four	Indicator:	 	 	 	
Moderate	Globalist	 18.0%	 48.6	 33.4	
Nationalist	 1.3%	 18.7	 80.0	
Anti-Immigrant/Moderate	
Nationalist		
3.1%	 32.9	 64.4	
Five	Indicator:	 	 	 	
Globalist		 41.4%	 47.4	 11.3	
Nationalist	 0.9%	 16.1	 83.1	
Moderate	 7.1%	 45.0	 48.0	
Note:	Traditional	Authoritarian	Indicators	from	fall	2011	wave	of		
the	study	where	N=1,451.		For	the	four	indicator	model,	χ2(4)=	341.55		
(p<0.001);	Cramér’s	V:	0.32.	For	the	five	indicator	model,	χ2(4)=	563.39		
(p<0.001);	Cramér’s	V:	0.41.		
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Appendix	Table	7:		Model	of	Voter	Choice	Utilizing	Partisan	Identification	as	Control	Instead	of	
Party	Leader	Feeling	Thermometers	
	
	 Four	Indicator:	 Five	Indicator:	
	 Labour/LibDem	v.	
Conservative	
Labour/LibDem	v.	
UKIP	
Labour/LibDem	v.	
Conservative	
Labour/LibDem	v.	
UKIP	
Globalist/	
Nationalist	Profile:	
	 	 	 	 	
Nationalist	 0.47*	
(0.24)	
1.88***	
(0.24)	
0.06	
(0.20)	
1.09***	
(0.19)	
Anti-Immigrant	
Nationalist	
0.45*	
(0.22)	
1.58***	
(0.22)	
XX	
	
XX	
	
Globalist	 XX	
	
XX	
	
-1.85***	
(0.45)	
-2.83***	
(0.78)	
Partisan	
Identification:	 	 	 	 	
Conservative	 4.32***	
(0.26)	
1.89***	
(0.30)	
4.22***	
(0.28)	
1.80***	
(0.30)	
Labour	 -3.21***	
(0.32)	
-3.02***	
(0.24)	
-3.24***	
(0.32)	
-3.08***	
(0.24)	
Liberal	Democrat	 -2.57***	
(0.33)	
-2.37***	
(0.32)	
-2,66***	
(0.33)	
-2.43***	
(0.32)	
UKIP	 1.00	
(0.61)	
4.15***	
(0.44)	
0.82	
(0.61)	
4.06***	
(0.44)	
Economic	
Perceptions:	 	 	 	 	
National	
Performance	
0.89***	
(0.10)	
0.14	
(0.09)	
0.87***	
(0.10)	
0.13	
(0.09)	
Constant:	 -4.58***	
(0.56)	
-3.92***	
(0.54)	
-4.17***	
(0.56)	
-3.14***	
(0.53)	
Notes:		Demographic,	Occupational,	and	Regional	controls	present	in	Table	6	included	in	estimations	but	not	
shown	due	to	space	considerations.		Data	from	March	2014	wave	of	the	survey.		Sample	Size	for	both	
estimates:	2994.		Four	Indicator	Model	Likelihood	Ratio	χ2(38df):	3754.49;	Five	Indicator	Model	Likelihood	
Ratio	χ2(38df):	3774.58.		***p<0.001;	**p<0.01;	*	p<0.05.	
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Appendix	Table	8:		Globalism/Nationalism	and	Belief	that	Judges	Have	Too	Much	Influence	
	
	 Four	Indicator:	 Five	Indicator	
	 Judges	Have	Too	Much	Influence	 Satisfaction	with	Democracy	
Globalist/	
Nationalist	Profile:	
	 	 	
Nationalist	 0.73***	
(0.18)	
0.29	
(0.15)	
Anti-Immigrant	
Nationalist	
0.38*	
(0.17)	
XX	
	
Globalist	 XX	
	
-0.76**	
(0.27)	
Party	
Identification:	 	 	
Conservative	 0.26	
(0.19)	
0.32	
(0.19)	
Labour	 0.14	
(0.18)	
0.18	
(0.18)	
Liberal	Democrat	 -0.23	
(0.30)	
-0.28	
(0.30)	
UKIP	 0.62*	
(0.29)	
0.67*	
(0.33)	
Courts:	 	 	
Supreme	Court	
Attitude	
-0.69***	
(0.19)	
-0.69***	
(0.19)	
Newspaper:	 	 	
Reads	Eurosceptic	
Press	
0.30*	
(0.15)	
0.29*	
(0.15)	
Constant:	 -1.64**	
(0.56)	
-1.47**	
(0.53)	
Notes:		Demographic,	Occupational,	and	Regional	controls	present	in	Table	6	included	in	estimations	but	not	
shown	due	to	space	considerations.		Data	from	March	2014	and	April	2015	waves	of	the	survey.		Supreme	
Court	Attitudes	averaged	from	measures	taken	from	April/May	2012,	February	2013,	and	Summer	2013	waves	
of	the	survey.			Sample	Size	for	both	estimates:	1,260.		Four	Indicator	Model	Likelihood	Ratio	χ2(20df):	140.99;	
Five	Indicator	Model	Likelihood	Ratio	χ2(20df):	138.06.		***p<0.001;	**p<0.01;	*	p<0.05.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
